How is news about fundamentals incorporated into asset prices? The topic confronted by this question-characterization of the price discovery process-is of basic importance to all of nancial economics. Unfortunately, it is also one of the least well-understood issues. Indeed, some in uential empirical studies have gone so far as to suggest that for some assets-notably foreign exchange-prices and fundamentals are largely disconnected.
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In this paper we provide an empirical examination of price discovery in the challenging context of foreign exchange. Using a newly constructed data set consisting of six years of real-time exchange-rate quotations, macroeconomic expectations, and macroeconomic realizations (announcements), we characterize the conditional means of U.S. dollar spot exchange rates for German Mark, British Pound, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, and the Euro. In particular, we show that announcement surprises (that is, the difference between expectations and realizations, or "news") produce conditional mean jumps, and we provide a detailed analysis of the speed and pattern of adjustment.
We show that conditional mean adjustments of exchange rates to news occur quickly, effectively amounting to "jumps," in contrast to conditional variance adjustments, which are much more gradual, and that an announcement's impact depends on its timing relative to other related announcements, and on whether the announcement time is known in advance. We nd, 1 The classic statement is of course Richard A. Meese and Kenneth Rogoff (1983) . For a good survey of the subsequent empirical exchange-rate literature through the early 1990's, see Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. Rose (1995) . In later work, Nelson C. Mark (1995) and Mark and Donggyu Sul (2001) nd that fundamentals matter in the long run but not in the short run. Martin D. D. Evans and Richard K. Lyons (2002) nd that order ow matters in the short run but fail to link order ow to fundamentals.
moreover, that the adjustment response pattern is characterized by a sign effect: bad news has greater impact than good news. Finally, we relate our results to recent theoretical and empirical work on asset return volatility and its association with information processing and price discovery.
The paper relates to earlier work in intriguing ways, but at least three features differentiate our ndings from previous results along important dimensions. These include our focus on foreign exchange markets, our focus on conditional mean as opposed to conditional variance, dynamics and the length and breadth of our sample of exchange-rate and announcement data. Let us discuss them brie y in turn.
First, we focus on foreign exchange markets as opposed to stock or bond markets, and we address the central open issue in exchange-rate economics-the link between exchange rates and fundamentals. It is comforting, however, that a number of recent papers focusing largely on bond markets reach conclusions similar to ours. Pierluigi Balduzzi et al. (2001) , for example, examine the effects of economic news on prices in the U.S. interdealer government bond market, nding strong news effects and quick incorporation of news into bond prices, while Michael J. Fleming and Eli M. Remolona (1997, 1999) show that the largest bond price movements stem from the arrival of news announcements. 2 Second, we focus primarily on exchange-rate conditional means as opposed to conditional variances. That is, we focus primarily on the determination of exchange rates themselves, as opposed to their volatility. We maintain this focus both because the conditional mean is of intrinsic interest, and because high-frequency discrete-time volatility cannot be extracted accurately unless the conditional mean is modeled adequately. Hence our work differs in important respects from that of Louis H. Ederington and Jae Ha Lee (1993) , Richard Payne (1996) , Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) , and Bollerslev et al. (2000) , for example, who examine calendar and news effects in high-frequency assetreturn volatility but do not consider the effects of news on returns themselves.
Third, we use a new data set which spans a comparatively long time period, and includes a broad set of exchange rates and macroeconomic indicators.
Notwithstanding the improvements obtained through the above consideration, our results are quite consistent with prior related work. Indeed, several studies have linked macroeconomic news announcements to jumps in exchange rates, and our ndings may be viewed as providing con rmation and elaboration. Charles Goodhart et al. (1993) , for example, examine one year of high-frequency Dollar/Pound exchange rates and two speci c news events-a U.S. trade gure announcement and a U.K. interest-rate change-and conclude in each case that the news caused an exchange-rate jump. Similarly, Alvaro Almeida et al. (1998) in their study of three years of high-frequency DM/ Dollar exchange rates and a larger set of news announcements, document systematic short-lived news effects. Finally, Kathryn M. Dominguez (1999) argues that most large exchange-rate changes occur within ten seconds of a macroeconomic news announcement, and that close timing of central bank interventions to news announcements increases their effectiveness.
We proceed as follows. In Section I we describe our high-frequency exchange-rate and macroeconomic expectations and announcements data. In Section II we characterize the speed and pattern of exchange-rate adjustment to macroeconomic news, and we document, among other things, the sign effects (i.e., a larger exchange-rate response to bad than good news). In Section III we relate the sign effects to recent theories of information processing and price discovery. We conclude in Section IV.
I. Real-Time Exchange Rates, Expected Fundamentals, and Announced Fundamentals
Throughout the paper we use data on exchangerate returns in conjunction with data on expectations and announcements of macroeconomic fundamentals. The data are novel in several respects, such as the simultaneous high frequency and long calendar span of the exchange-rate returns, as well as the real-time nature of the expectations and announcements of fundamentals. Here we describe them in some detail.
A. Exchange-Rate Data
The raw 5-minute CHF/$, DM/$, Euro/$, Pound/$, and Yen/$ return series were obtained from Olsen and Associates. The full sample consists of continuously recorded 5-minute returns from January 3, 1992 through December 30, 1998, or 2,189 days, for a total of 2,189 z 288 5 630,432 high-frequency foreign exchange (FX) return observations. As in Ulrich A. Müller et al. (1990) and Michel M. Dacorogna et al. (1993) , we use all of the interbank quotes that appeared on the Reuters screen during the sample period to construct our 5-minute returns. Each quote consists of a bid and an ask price together with a "time stamp" to the nearest second. After ltering the data for outliers and other anomalies, we obtain the average log price at each 5-minute mark by linearly interpolating the average of the log bid and the log ask at the two closest ticks. We then construct continuously compounded returns as the change in these 5-minute average log bid and ask prices. Goodhart et al. (1996) and Jon Danielsson and Payne (1999) nd that the basic characteristics of 5-minute FX returns constructed from quotes closely match those calculated from transaction prices (which are not generally available for the foreign exchange market).
It is well known that the activity in the foreign exchange market slows decidedly during weekends and certain holiday nontrading periods; see Mü ller et al. (1990) . Hence, as is standard in the literature, we explicitly excluded a number of days from the raw 5-minute return series. Whenever we did so, we always cut from 21:05 GMT the night before to 21:00 GMT that evening. This particular de nition of a "day" was motivated by the ebb and ow in the daily FX activity patterns documented in Bollerslev and Ian Domowitz (1993) and keeps the daily periodicity intact. In addition to the thin weekend trading period from Friday 21:05 GMT until Sunday 21:00 GMT, we removed several xed holidays, including Christmas (December 24 -26), New Year's (December 31-January 2), and July Fourth. We also cut the moving holidays of Good Friday, Easter Monday, Memorial Day, July Fourth (when it falls of cially on July 3), and Labor Day, as well as Thanksgiving and the day after. Although our cuts do not account for all of the holiday market slowdowns, they capture the most important daily calendar effects.
Finally, we deleted some of the returns contaminated by brief lapses in the Reuters data feed. This problem, which occurs almost exclusively during the earliest part of the sample, manifests itself as sequences of zero or constant 5-minute returns in places where missing quotes had been interpolated. To remedy this, we simply removed from each exchange-rate series the days containing the 15 longest zero and constant runs. Because of the overlap among sets of days de ned by this criterion, we actually removed only 25 days.
In the end we are left with 1,724 days of data, containing T 5 1,724 z 288 5 496,512 high-frequency 5-minute return observations. Standard descriptive statistics reveal that the 5-minute returns have means that are negligible and dwarfed by the standard deviations, and that they are approximately symmetric but distinctly non-Gaussian, due to excess kurtosis. LjungBox statistics indicate serial correlation in both returns and absolute returns.
To assess the economic relevance of the temporal dependencies in the return series, we turn to the autocorrelations in column one of Figure 1 . The raw returns display tiny, but nevertheless statistically signi cant, serial correlation at the very shortest lags, presumably due to microstructure effects. However, the short-lag return serial correlation is negligible relative to the strong serial correlation in absolute returns, shown in column two of Figure 1 . The sample autocorrelations of absolute returns display very slow decay and pronounced diurnal variation, in line with the results of Dacorogna et al. (1993) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) . Interestingly, not only the shapes but also the amplitudes of the diurnal patterns in absolute return autocorrelations differ noticeably across currencies.
B. Expected Fundamentals, Announced Fundamentals, and News
We use the International Money Market Services (MMS) real-time data on expected and realized ("announced") macroeconomic fundamentals, de ning "news" as the difference between expectations and realizations. Every week since 1977, MMS has conducted a Friday telephone survey of about 40 money managers, collected forecasts of all indicators to be re- 
Notes:
We plot the sample autocorrelations of returns and absolute returns for ve currencies, together with Bartlett's approximate 95-percent con dence bands under the null hypothesis of white noise. In each graph, the vertical axis is the sample autocorrelation and the horizontal axis is displacement in 5-minute intervals. To avoid contamination from shifts in and out of daylight saving time, we calculate the sample autocorrelations using only days corresponding to U.S. daylight saving time.
leased during the next week, and reported the median forecasts from the survey. Numerous in uential studies, from early work such as Thomas J. Urich and Paul Wachtel (1984) through recent work such as Balduzzi et al. (2001) , have veri ed that the MMS expectations contain valuable information about the forecasted variable, and in most cases are unbiased and less variable than those produced from extrapolative benchmarks such as ARMA models. Table 1 provides a brief description of salient aspects of U.S. and German economic news announcements. We show the total number of observations in our news sample, the agency reporting each announcement, and the time of the announcement release. Note that U.S. announcements times are known in advance, whereas only the day for the German announcements are known in advance but their timing within the day is variable and unknown a priori.
The target Fed funds rate deserves special mention. The Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) announcement of the federal funds rate target, although likely producing important news, is nonstandard and hence is not typically examined. It is nonstandard because prior to February 1994 it was not announced; instead, the FOMC signaled the target rate, but did not state it explicitly, through open market operations performed from 11:30 to 11:35 A.M. Eastern time on the day of the FOMC meeting. In February 1994, the FOMC began to announce changes in the target rate on meeting days, albeit at irregular times, and from 1995 onward it announced the target rate on meeting days regularly at 2:15 P.M. Eastern time, as described in Kenneth N. Kuttner (2001) .
To assess the effects of FOMC news, we need to know announcement days and times, as well as the market's expected Fed funds rate target and the announced (or signaled) value. Determination of announcement days and times is relatively straightforward. We collected the irregular 1994 announcement times from Reuters.
3 Before 1994 we use an 11:30 A.M. Eastern announcement time, and after March, 1995 we use a 2:15 P.M. announcement time. 4 Determination of market expectations is similarly straightforward: we use MMS survey data on expected federal fund rate targets from January 1992 to December 1998.
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The announcements themselves are trickier to construct, due to the pre-1994 FOMC secrecy; we use the announcement data constructed by Michael W. Brandt et al. (2001) , kindly provided by Kenneth Kavajecz.
In Figure 2 we show the pattern of U.S. release dates throughout the month.
6 This is of potential importance, because there is some redundancy across indicators. For example, consumer and producer price indexes, although of course not the same, are nevertheless related, and Figure 2 reveals that the producer price index is released earlier in the month. Hence one might conjecture that producer price news would explain more exchange-rate return variation than consumer price news, as the typical amount of consumer price news revealed may be relatively small given the producer price news revealed earlier in the month. 5 One could also attempt to infer expectations from Fed funds futures prices, as in Glenn D. Rudebusch (1998) and Kuttner (2001) . 6 The design of the gure follows Chart 2 of Fleming and Remolona (1997) . Before proceeding, we pause to discuss in greater detail the possibility that the MMS forecasts may not capture all information available immediately before the announcement. Surely information does not stop owing between the time that the MMS forecast is produced and the time that the macroeconomic indicator is realized; hence the MMS forecasts may be "stale." Just how stale they are, however, is an empirical matter. This issue has been investigated already in the context of news effects on interest rates by Balduzzi et al. (1998) , who regress the actual announcement, A i , on the median forecast of the MMS survey, F i , and the change in the (very announcement-sensitive) ten-year note yield from the time of the survey to the time of the announcement, Dy: A it 5 a 0i 1 a 1i F it 1 a 2i Dy t 1 e it .
This particular regression facilitates the testing of several hypotheses. First, if there is information content in the MMS survey data, the coef cient estimates a 1i should be positive and signi cant. Second, if the survey information is unbiased, the a 0i coef cient estimates should be insigni cant, and the slope terms a 1i should be insigni cantly different from unity. Finally, if expectations are revised between the survey and the announcement, there should be a reaction in the bond price at the time of the forecast revision, and we should see a relationship between the change in yield and the announcement. As already mentioned, Balduzzi et al. (2001) nd, as have many others, that most of the MMS forecasts contain information and are unbiased. 7 More importantly for the issue at hand, however, they also nd that for most indicators the hypothesis that a 2i 5 0 cannot be rejected, indicating that the MMS forecasts do not appear signi cantly stale.
II. Exchange Rates and Fundamentals
We will specify and estimate a model of high-frequency exchange-rate dynamics that allows for the possibility of news affecting both the conditional mean and the conditional variance. Our goal is to determine whether 7 In addition to being unbiased, Douglas K. Pearce and V. Vance Roley (1985) and Grant McQueen and Roley (1993) also nd that the MMS surveys are more accurate, in the sense of having lower mean squared errors, than the forecasts from standard autoregressive time-series models.
FIGURE 2. U.S. MACROECONOMIC ANNOUNCEMENT RELEASE DATES DATA FOR MONTH X
Notes: We show the sequence of announcement dates corresponding to data for month X, for most of the economic indicators used in the paper. For example, March (month X) consumer credit data are announced between May (month X 1 2) 5 and May 10. GDP data are special, because they are released only quarterly. Hence, the GDP data released in a given month are either advance, preliminary, or nal depending on whether the month is the rst, second, or third of the quarter. For example, rst quarter Q1 GDP advance data are announced between April (month X 1 1) 27 and May 4, rst quarter GDP preliminary data are announced between May (month X 1 2) 27 and June 4, and rst quarter GDP nal data are announced between June (month X 1 3) 27 and July 4. The table is based on 2001 Schedule of Release Dates for Principal Federal Economic Indicators, produced by the U.S. Of ce of Management and Budget and available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/OMB/ pubpress/pei2001.html.
high-frequency exchange-rate movements are linked to fundamentals, and if so how. Our motivations are twofold. The rst motivation is obviously the possibility of re ning our understanding of the fundamental determinants of exchange rates, the central and still largely unresolved question of exchange-rate economics. The second motivation is the possibility of improved high-frequency volatility estimation via allowance for jumps due to news, as misspecication of the conditional mean (for example by failing to allow for jumps, if jumps are in fact present) will produce distorted volatility estimates in discrete time.
A. Modeling the Response of Exchange Rates to News
We model the 5-minute spot exchange rate, R t , as a linear function of I lagged values of itself, and J lags of news on each of K fundamentals:
(1)
As discussed earlier, K 5 41 and T 5 496,512. We chose I 5 5 and J 5 2 based on the Schwarz and Akaike information criteria. 9 We allow the disturbance term in the 5-minute return model (1) to be heteroskedastic. Following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) , we estimate the model using a two-step weighted least-squares (WLS) procedure. We rst estimate the conditional mean model (1) by ordinary least-squares regression, and then we estimate the time-varying volatility of « t from the regression residuals, which we use to perform a weighted least-squares estimation of (1). We approximate the disturbance volatility using the model:
The left-hand-side variable, z« t z, is the absolute value of the residual of equation (1), which proxies for the volatility in the 5-minute interval t. As revealed by the right-hand side of equation (2), we model 5-minute volatility as driven partly by the volatility over the day containing the 5-minute interval in question, ŝ d(t) , partly by news S k,t , and partly by a calendar-effect pattern consisting largely of intraday effects that capture the high-frequency rhythm of deviations of intraday volatility from the daily average. Speci cally, we split the calendar effects into two parts. The rst is a Fourier exible form with trigonometric terms that obey a strict 8 In this paper, we are primarily interested in exchangerate volatility only insofar as it is relevant for inference regarding exchange-rate conditional mean dynamics. We have reserved for future work a detailed analysis of volatility in relation to conditional mean and variance jumps. For a discussion of the effects of conditional mean and variance jumps on realized volatility, see Andersen et al. (2003) . 9 We also tried allowing for negative J, to account for announcement leakage before the of cial time, and more generally to account for the fact that the MMS forecasts might not capture all information available immediately before the announcement, but doing so proved unnecessary. This accords with the earlier-discussed nding of Balduzzi et al. (2001) that, to a good approximation, the MMS forecasts do capture all information available immediately before the announcement. Moreover, if leakage is present (and introspection, if not the empirics, suggests that there is likely some leakage, however small) then our estimated news response coef cients, which correspond only to the impact at the time of the of cial announcement, are lower bounds for the total news impact. periodicity of one day. 10 The second is a set of dummy variables D r,t capturing the Japanese lunch, the Japanese open, and the U.S. late afternoon during U.S. daylight saving time.
Let us explain in greater detail. Consider rst the daily volatility, ŝ d(t) , which is the one-dayahead volatility forecast for day d(t) (the day that contains time t) from a simple daily conditionally Gaussian GARCH(1, 1) model using spot exchange-rate returns from January 2, 1986 through December 31, 1998. Because ŝ d(t) is intended to capture the "average" level of volatility on day d(t), it makes sense to construct it using a GARCH(1, 1) model, which is routinely found to provide accurate approximations to daily asset return volatility dynamics.
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Now consider the Fourier part for the calendar effects. This is a very exible functional form that may be given a semi-nonparametric interpretation (A. Ronald Gallant, 1981) . The Schwarz and Akaike information criteria chose a rather low Q 5 4 for all currencies, which achieves parametric economy and promotes smoothness in the intraday seasonal pattern.
Finally, consider the news effects S and nonFourier calendar effects D. To promote tractability while simultaneously maintaining exibility, we impose polynomial structure on the response patterns associated with the b kj9 and g rj0 parameters.
12 For example, if a particular news surprise affects volatility from time t 0 to time t 0 1 J9, we can represent the impact over the event window t 5 0, 1, ... , J9 by a polynomial speci cation, p(t) 5 c 0 1 c 1 t 1 ... 1 c P t P . For P 5 J9 this would imply the estimation of J9 1 1 polynomial coef cients and would not constrain the response pattern in any way. Use of a lower-ordered polynomial, however, constrains the response in helpful ways: it promotes parsimony and hence tractability, retains exibility of approximation, and facilitates the imposition of sensible constraints on the response pattern. For example, we can enforce the requirement that the impact effect slowly fades to zero by imposing p( J9) 5 0.
Polynomial speci cations ensure that the response patterns are completely determined by the response horizon J9, the polynomial order P, and the endpoint constraint imposed on p( J9). For news effects S, we take J9 5 12, P 5 3, and p( J9) 5 0.
13 The last condition leads to a polynomial with one less parameter; substituting t 5 12 into p(t) we have, 14 In closing this subsection, we note that we could have handled the volatility dynamics differently. In particular, instead of estimating explicit parametric models of volatility dynamics, we could have simply estimated equation (1) using heteroskedasticity-and serial-correlation 10 We also translate the Fourier terms leftward as appropriate during U.S. daylight saving time. (Only North America and Europe have daylight saving time.) 11 For surveys of GARCH modeling in nancial environments, see Bollerslev et al. (1992) and Diebold and Jose Lopez (1995) . Other possibilities, also explored with little change in qualitative results, include use of daily realized volatilities as in Andersen et al. (2001) and Andersen et al. (2001a Andersen et al. ( , 2003 .
12 This is particularly important in the case of conditional variance as opposed to conditional mean dynamics, because conditional variances turn out to adjust to shocks more slowly than do conditional means, thereby involving longer distributed lags, as we will subsequently emphasize. Hence, although tractability did not require the imposition of polynomial shape on the conditional mean distributed lags, it greatly enhances the accuracy of the conditional variance estimates. 13 The "constraint" that volatility news effects linger for at most an hour ( J9 5 12) is nonbinding. Initial experimentation allowing for J9 5 36 revealed that one hour was enough for full adjustment, for all indicators and currencies.
14 The Japanese opening is at 8 P.M. Eastern daylight saving time, the Japanese lunch hour is 11 P.M. through 12:30 A.M. Eastern daylight saving time, the U.S. late afternoon during daylight saving time is de ned to start at 3 P.M. Eastern daylight saving time.
consistent (HAC) standard errors. We nd that approach less attractive than the one we adopted, for at least three reasons. First, we are interested not only in performing heteroskedasticity-robust inference about the coef cients (done both by our WLS and by HAC estimation) in equation (1), but also in obtaining the most ef cient estimates of those coef cients. Second, although HAC estimation is asymptotically robust to residual heteroskedasticity of unknown form, its general robustness may come at the price of inferior nite-sample performance relative to the estimation of a well-speci ed parametric volatility model. 15 Third, despite the fact that they are not central to the analysis in the present paper, both the intra-and interday volatility patterns are of intrinsic nancial economic interest and hence one may want estimates of these in other situations. Notwithstanding all of these a priori arguments against the use of HAC estimation in the present context, as a check on the robustness of our results, we also performed all of the empirical work related to the mean effects using HAC estimation, with no change in any of the qualitative results (although a number of the coef cients were no longer statistically signi cant).
B. News Effects I: News Announcements
Matter, and Quickly
The model (1)- (2) provides an accurate approximation to both conditional mean and conditional variance dynamics. Since the model contains so many variables and their lags, it would prove counterproductive to simply report all of the parameter estimates. Instead, Figure 3 shows the actual and tted average intraday volatility patterns, which obviously agree fairly closely. Further, in Figure 4 we present graphically the results for the most important indicators, and we discuss those results (and some others, not shown in the gure) in what follows.
Let us rst consider the effects of U.S. macroeconomic news. Throughout, news exerts a generally statistically signi cant in uence on exchange rates, whereas expected announcements generally do not. That is, only unanticipated shocks to fundamentals affect exchange rates, in accordance with the predictions of rational expectations theory. Many U.S. 
Notes:
The solid line is the average intraday pattern of the absolute residual return z« t z over the 288 5-minute intervals within the day, where « t is the residual from the exchangerate conditional mean model (1) in the text. The dashed line is the tted intraday pattern of z« t z from the exchange-rate volatility model (2) in the text. To avoid contamination from shifts in and out of daylight saving time, we construct the gures using only days corresponding to U.S. daylight saving time.
tial unemployment claims, NAPM index, retail sales, consumer con dence, and advance GDP. The general pattern is one of very quick exchange-rate conditional mean adjustment, characterized by a jump immediately following the announcement, and little movement thereafter. Favorable U.S. "growth news" tends to produce dollar appreciation, and conversely. This is consistent with a variety of models of exchange-rate determination, from simple monetary models (e.g., Mark, 1995) to more sophisticated frameworks involving a U.S. central bank reaction function displaying a preference for low in ation (e.g., John B. Taylor, 1993) . 16 One can see from the center panel of the rst row of Figure 4 , for example, that a one standard deviation U.S. payroll employment surprise tends to appreciate (if positive) or depreciate (if negative) the dollar against the DM by 0.16 16 For most of our macroeconomic indicators, including those on which we primarily focus, the sign of a "good shock" is clear: movements associated with increased real U.S. economic activity are good for the dollar. Sometimes, however, it is not obvious which direction should be viewed as good, as perhaps with consumer credit.
FIGURE 4. EXCHANGE-RATE RESPONSES TO U.S. NEWS

Notes:
We graph the three news response coef cients associated with the exchange-rate conditional mean regression (1), corresponding to responses at the announcement, ve minutes after the announcement, and ten minutes after the announcement. We also show two standard error bands, under the null hypothesis of a zero response, obtained using the weighted least-squares estimation method described in the text.
percent.
17 This is a sizeable move, from both statistical and economic perspectives. On the statistical side, we note that only 0.7 percent of our 5-minute returns show an appreciation or depreciation bigger than 0.10 percent. On the economic side, we note that 0.16 percent is also large relative to the average DM/$ spread, which tends to be around 0.06 percent during the period we study (see, Hendrik Bessembinder, 1994, and Joel Hasbrouck, 1999, Table 1 ).
It is important to note that, although closely timed news events are highly correlated, the correlation does not create a serious multicolinearity problem except in a few speci c instances. For example, industrial production and capacity utilization are released at the same time, and they are highly correlated (0.64). In general, however, the event that two announcements within the same category (e.g., real activity) are released simultaneously is rare. Now let us focus on the DM/$ rate in some detail. It is of particular interest both because of its central role in the international nancial system during the period under study, and because we have news data on both U.S. and German macroeconomic indicators.
18 First consider the effects of U.S. macroeconomic news on the DM/$ rate. News announcements on a variety of U.S. indicators signi cantly affect the DM/$ rate, including payroll employment, durable goods orders, trade balance, initial claims, NAPM index, retail sales, consumer con dence, CPI, PPI, industrial production, leading indicators, housing starts, construction spending, federal funds rate, new home sales, and GDP (advance, preliminary, and nal). Now consider the effect of German macroeconomic news on the DM/$ rate. 19 In sharp contrast to the large number of U.S. macroeconomic indicators whose news affect the DM/$ rate, only very few of the German macroeconomic indicators have a signi cant effect (M3 and industrial production). We conjecture that the disparity may be due to the fact, detailed in Table 1 , that the release times of U.S. macroeconomic indicators are known exactly (day and time) but only inexactly for Germany (day but not time). Uncertain release times may result in less market liquidity (and trading) around the announcement times, hence resulting in smaller news effects around the announcements, ultimately producing a more gradual adjustment, perhaps for a few hours after the announcements. Alternatively, greater preannouncement leakage in Germany may result in adjustments taking place gradually in the days prior to the actual announcement.
Most of the explanatory power of the exchange-rate conditional mean model (1) comes from the lagged values of the dependent variable and the contemporaneous news announcement. Hence, although 58 percent of the days in our sample contain a news announcement, to a good approximation the news predicts only the direction and magnitude of the exchange-rate movement during the 5-minute post-release intervals, which correspond to only two-tenths of one percent of the sample observations. To focus on the importance of news during announcement periods, we now estimate the model
where R t is the 5-minute return from time t to time t 1 1 and S kt is the standardized news corresponding to announcement k (k 5 1, ... , 41) at time t, and the estimates are based on only those observations ( R t , S kt ) such that an announcement was made at time t. We show the estimation results in Table 2 , which contains a number of noteworthy features. First, news on many of the fundamentals exerts a signi cant in uence on exchange rates. This is of course expected, given our earlier estimation results for equation (1) as summarized in Figure 4 . News from FOMC deliberations, for example, clearly in uences exchange rates: the large and statistically signi cant coef cients, and the high R 
U.S. Announcements
Quarterly in an equation such as (3) must be low when computed across all 5-minute observations. In contrast, one naturally expects higher R 2 values when computed using only announcement observations, although the precise size is of course an empirical matter. (2000) and Cheung and Menzie David Chinn (2001) , obtained by surveying traders, cohere reassuringly with the model-based results documented here. In particular, Cheung and Chinn (2001) report that traders believe that exchange rates adjust almost instantaneously following news announcements, and that news regarding real variables is more in uential than news regarding nominal variables, which is entirely consistent with the empirical results reported in Table 2 .
C. News Effects II: Announcement Timing Matters
One might wonder whether, within the same general category of macroeconomic indicators, news on those released earlier tend to have greater impact than those released later. To evaluate this conjecture, we grouped the U.S. indicators into seven types: real activity, consumption, investment, government purchases, net exports, prices, and forward-looking. Within each group, we arranged the announcements in the chronological order described in Figure 2 . The conjecture is generally veri ed. In the estimates of equation (3) within each indicator group, the announcements released earliest tend to have the most statistically signi cant coefcients and the highest R 2 values. 21 In Figure 5 we plot the R 2 of equation (3) within each indicator group, as a function of the announcement timing. The clearly prevalent downward slopes reveal that the early announcements do indeed have the greatest impact.
The fact that "announcement timing matters" 
Notes:
We estimate the contemporaneous exchange-rate news response model, R t 5 b k S kt 1 « t , where R t is the 5-minute return from time t to time t 1 1 and S kt is the standardized news corresponding to announcement k (k 5 1, ... , 41) made at time t. We estimate the regression using only those observations ( R t , S kt ) such that an announcement was made at time t. We report the b k and R 2 values, and we mark with an asterisk those coef cients that are statistically signi cant at the 5-percent level, using heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors.
helps with the interpretation of our earlierreported empirical results in Table 2 , which indicate that only seven of the 40 announcements signi cantly impacted all the currency speci cations. The reason is that many of the announcements are to some extent redundant, and the market then only reacts to those released earlier. Hence, for example, U.S. durable goods 
S. NEWS EFFECTS AS A FUNCTION OF RELEASE TIME
Notes:
We estimate the contemporaneous exchange-rate news response model, R t 5 b k S kt 1 « t , where R t is the 5-minute return from time t to time t 1 1 and S kt is the standardized news corresponding to announcement k (k 5 1, ... , 17) made at time t. We estimate the regression using only those observations ( R t , S kt ) such that an announcement was made at time t. On the vertical axis we display the R 2 values, and on the horizontal axis we display macroeconomic news announcements in the chronological order documented in Table 2 . The "news numbers" are as follows:
GDP
Real Activity Investment Forward-Looking orders matter for all currency pairs but U.S. factory orders, which are released later, do not.
D. News Effects III: Volatility Adjusts to News Gradually
As discussed previously and documented in Figure 4 , exchange rates adjust to news immediately. It is interesting to note, however, that exchange-rate volatilities adjust only gradually, with complete adjustment occurring only after J9 5 12 5-minute periods, or one hour.
We provide details in Table 3 . As already noted, and as shown again in the top panel of the table, the contemporaneous return response coef cients are sizeable and statistically signi cant, and the full response occurs immediately. In contrast, the contemporaneous volatility response coef cients, although statistically signi cant, are smaller, as shown in the middle panel of the table. Importantly, however, the complete response of volatility to news occurs only after an hour or so, and it is noticeably larger than either the contemporaneous volatility response or the contemporaneous return response, as shown in the bottom panel of the table.
E. News Effects IV: Pure Announcement Effects are Present in Volatility
It is possible that the mere presence of an announcement might boost volatility, quite apart from the size of the associated surprise. To explore this possibility we add to the returns equation (1) J lags of announcement period dummies on each of K fundamentals, and we also add to the volatility equation (2) J9 lags of announcement period dummies on each of K fundamentals. As shown in Table  4 , the announcement dummies are generally insigni cant in the returns equation (1) but generally signi cant in the volatility equation (2), in line with earlier results for bond markets such as Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999) . News effects are still important, however, in both conditional mean and variance dynamics. 
and we report estimates of the contemporaneous response of exchange-rate returns to news, b k0 . We also estimate the disturbance volatility model (2),
and we report estimates of the contemporaneous response of exchange-rate volatility to news, b k0 5 g k p k (0), as described in the text. Finally, we also report estimates of the cumulative volatility response, ¥ j95 0 12 g k p k ( j9), as described in the text. Asterisks denote statistical signi cance at the 5-percent level.
F. News Effects V: Announcement Effects are Asymmetric-Responses Vary with the Sign of the News
We have seen that news about macroeconomic fundamentals signi cantly affect high-frequency exchange rates. Thus far we have allowed only for constant news effects, but it is natural to go farther and ask whether the news effects vary with the sign of the surprise. To address this issue we generalize equation (3) by allowing the impact response coef cient b k to be a linear function of the news surprise S kt , allowing for a different constant and slope on each side of the origin, (4)
Inserting (4) into (3) yields the impact response speci cation, 
and we report estimates of the contemporaneous return response to news and to announcement periods, b k0 and u k0 , respectively. We also add to equation (2) J9 lags of announcement period dummies on each of K fundamentals,
and report estimates of the contemporaneous return response to news and to announcement periods, b k0 and u k0 , respectively. Asterisks denote statistical signi cance at the 5-percent level.
right of the origin the "news impact curve." 22 In the top row of Figure 6 we show the news impact curves averaged across all macroeconomic fundamentals, k 5 1, ... , 41. It is clear that, on average, the effect of macroeconomic news often varies with its sign. In particular, negative surprises often have greater impact than positive surprises.
23
It is interesting to see whether the sign effect prevails when we look separately at the most 22 Despite the super cial resemblance in terms of documenting asymmetric responses to news, our work is very different from that of Engle and Ng (1993) and many subsequent related studies. In particular, the Engle-Ng news impact curve tracks the variance of equity returns conditional upon the sign and size of past returns (with no allowance for a time-varying conditional mean return), whereas our news impact curve tracks the mean of foreign exchange returns conditional upon the sign and size of macroeconomic news. 23 To the best of our knowledge, such sign effects have not previously been documented for the foreign exchange market. Evidence of asymmetric conditional-mean news effects exists in other contexts, however. For example, Jennifer Conrad et al. (2001) nd asymmetric effects of earnings news on stock returns, while recent concurrent work by Hautsch and Hess (2001) details an asymmetric response to employment news in the T-bond futures market.
FIGURE 6. U.S. NEWS IMPACT CURVES
Notes:
In the top row we show the news impact curves averaged across all macroeconomic fundamentals, k 5 1, ... , 41. In the remaining rows we show the news impact curves for payroll employment, trade balance, durable good orders, and initial claims. See text for details. important news announcements. In the remaining rows of Figure 6 we show the news impact curves for payroll employment, trade balance, durable goods orders, and initial claims. The sign effect is generally maintained, although there is some variation across indicators and currencies. Asymmetry in the Yen/$, DM/$, and CHF/$ response to payroll employment and trade balance news, for example, is very pronounced, whereas it is largely absent in the Pound/$ and Euro/$ response.
In the next section we explore more deeply the economics behind the asymmetric response. Recent theoretical models suggest that the asymmetry may be driven, in part, by the dynamics of uncertainty regarding the underlying state of the economy. It turns out that our MMS data set contains not only expectations, but also a measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations, the standard deviation. Using the cross-sectional standard deviation as a proxy for state uncertainty, we can therefore directly assess a key mechanism thought to generate asymmetric response, to which we now turn.
III. Asymmetric Response, Information
Processing, and Price Discovery
Two strands of literature imply asymmetry in the response of exchange rates to news. In particular, they imply that bad news in "good times" should have an unusually large impact, a view that is also common in the practitioner community, as emphasized by Conrad et al. (2001) . Note that our entire sample takes place in good times-1992 through 1998. Hence the theoretical prediction that "bad news in good times should have unusually large effects," degenerates in our sample period to "bad news should have unusually large effects," which, to a reasonably good approximation, is what we found earlier.
The rst strand of the literature is "behavioral" and focuses primarily on equities, at the rm level. Nicholas Barberis et al. (1998) , for example, model investors as believing that rm earnings follow a two-state regime-switching process-erroneously, as earnings actually follow a random walk-with mean-reverting earnings in state 0 and upward-trending earnings in state 1. Hence a series of positive earnings leads investors to infer that state 1 holds, with the concomitant expectation of additional positive earnings. In such a situation, bad news generates a large negative response because it is a surprise, whereas good news generates little response because it is anticipated.
The second relevant strand of the literature uses a rational-expectations equilibrium approach and focuses more on the market level as opposed to the rm level, as in Pietro Veronesi (1999) , Timothy C. Johnson (2001a, b) , and Alexander David and Veronesi (2001) . Veronesi (1999) , in particular, models investors as (correctly) believing that the economy follows a two-state regime-switching process, with "low" and "high" states corresponding to recessions and expansions. Agents solve a signal extraction problem to determine the probability p(t) of being in the high state, and equilibrium asset prices can be shown to be increasing and convex functions of p(t). The intuition for this key result is simple. Suppose that p(t 2 1) ' 1, i.e., investors believe that the high state almost surely prevails. Then if bad news arrives at time t, two things happen: rst, expected future asset values decrease, and second, p(t) decreases (i.e., state risk increases). Risk-averse investors require additional returns for bearing this additional risk; hence they require an additional discount on the asset price, which drops by more than it would in a present-value model. Conversely, suppose investors are con dent that the low state prevails, i.e., p(t 2 1) ' 0. Then if good news arrives at time t, expected future asset values increase, but p(t) also increases (i.e., state risk again increases). As before, investors require additional returns for bearing this additional risk; hence they require a discount on the asset price, which increases by less than it would in a presentvalue model.
For a number of reasons, it is not our intention here to explicitly test the practitioner claim that prices respond most strongly to bad news in good times, or to directly implement Veronesi's model or to combine it with the BarberisShleifer-Vishy model. First, our data set is not well-suited to that purpose; as mentioned above, it contains only the expansionary 1990's. Second, Conrad et al. (2001) have already made admirable progress in that regard, nding general support for the assertion that (stock) prices respond most strongly to bad news in good times. Third, the Barberis-Schleifer-Vishny model is not particularly well-suited to the forex context relevant here, as it focuses on the earnings stream for an individual rm.
Instead, we take as true the practitioner claim that prices respond most strongly to bad news in good times, and we focus on the explanation embodied in Veronesi's model. We use an interesting feature of our MMS expectations data to assess the key alleged mechanism through which bad news in good times translates into large price moves: increased uncertainty about the state of the economy. In particular, we have data not only on the median expectations of macroeconomic fundamentals, but also on the associated standard deviations across the individual forecasters. Hence we can check directly whether uncertainty about the state of the economy, as proxied by the standard deviation of expectations across the individual forecasters, increases following the arrival of bad news in good times.
24 Before proceeding to examine the effect of bad news arrivals on subsequent forecast dispersion, however, two issues arise.
First, it is not clear what timing in the data matches the generic timing in the model. Clearly, bad news at time t 2 1 means that expectations for time t are formed in a bad news environment, but what if the news at t 2 2 was bad and the news at t 2 1 was not? Perhaps agents have a memory that lasts longer than one announcement period, so that even the latter case could be viewed as a bad news environment. In general, we might say that we are in a bad news environment if the news was bad at any of times t 2 1, t 2 2, ... , t 2 d, for some d. Second, to enhance our chances of detecting the "Veronesi effect," if it exists, we may not want to track the arrival of all bad news, but rather only bad news that exceeds some minimal threshold, say the pth percentile of the distribution of bad news, where p, like d, must be chosen. As a benchmark, we simply set d 5 1 and p 5 50 percent (i.e., the median). Figure 7 plots the corresponding standard deviation of the MMS payroll employment, durable goods orders, and trade balance forecasts. The shaded areas indicate a bad news environment using the criteria d 5 1 and p 5 50 percent. Analyst forecast dispersion is indeed higher following bad news than at other times; speci cally, the uncertainty of payroll employment is 30 percent higher, the uncertainty of durable goods orders is 6 percent higher, and the uncertainty of the trade balance is 12 percent higher. These effects are robust to reasonable variation in p and d.
IV. Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Research
The goal of the research on which this paper reports is to deepen our understanding of the links 24 Of course, the notion of forecast uncertainty and the forecast dispersion across forecasters are not exactly equivalent concepts. Victor Zarnowitz and Louis A. Lambros (1987) show, however, that they are generally positively correlated. between exchange-rate movements and news about fundamentals. To that end, in this paper we have documented important news effects, with asymmetric response patterns. Let us conclude by relating our results to work on order ow and drawing implications for future research.
In recent innovative work, Evans and Lyons (2002) show that signed order ow is a good predictor of subsequent exchange-rate movements. This work is important in that it enhances our understanding of the determinants of high-frequency exchange-rate movements, but less satisfying in that it remains ignorant about the determinants of high-frequency order ow. We, in contrast, have shown that news affects exchange rates. Combining our perspectives focuses attention on the causal links among news, order ow, and forex movements, which in our view is a prime candidate for future research. It will be of interest, for example, to determine whether news affects exchange rates via order ow or instantaneously. 25 In work done subsequently to the rst draft of this paper, Evans and Lyons (2001) and Kenneth A. Froot and Tarun Ramadorai (2002) tackle precisely that issue.
A second key direction for future research is pushing farther with the implications of Veronesi (1999) for the analysis of high-frequency news effects. Presently we have veri ed that the key mechanism that ampli es the effects of bad news in good times in Veronesi's model-increased state uncertainty-is operative in the data. However, one could potentially go farther and exploit the broader implications of Veronesi's work for our approach, namely that news effects are in general a function of state uncertainty, by including interactions of news with state uncertainty in both our conditional mean and conditional variance speci cations. This would be particularly interesting if data were available on exchange rates and fundamentals spanning bad as well as good times, but as of this writing, such data remain elusive.
Third, it would be of interest to explore not only the effects of regularly scheduled quantitative news on macroeconomic fundamentals, but also the effects of irregularly scheduled, qualitative "headline news," as prices, and perhaps order ow, may reasonably be expected to respond to both. 26 It is not obvious, however, how to do so in a compelling way; both the conceptual and the practical complications seem daunting.
Fourth, it will be of interest to attempt an analysis of structural stability, as the market may change its view about which news is important for exchange rates, or about how to interpret the sign of a surprise. In some interpretations, for example, a positive U.S. in ation surprise would tend to produce dollar depreciation (e.g., when the U.S. central bank reaction function assigns relatively low weight to the level of in ation), whereas in other interpretations it would produce dollar appreciation (e.g., when the U.S. central bank reaction function shows strong preference for low in ation, as in Taylor, 1993) .
Finally, we look forward to characterizing the joint responses of the foreign exchange, stock, and bond markets to real-time news surprises. Responses have now been studied for each market in isolation: Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Balduzzi et al. (2001) study the bond market, Mark J. Flannery and Aris Protopapadakis (2002) study the stock market, and this paper, of course, studies the foreign exchange market. A multivariate framework, however, will facilitate analysis of cross-market movements and interactions, or lack thereof, which may for example shed light on agents' views regarding central bank reaction functions.
